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Abstract
Constructing a duopoly model with non-constant marginal costs
and a strict Pareto criterion, this paper examines welfare effects of
world-price-fixing tariff reductions accompanied by adjustments of a
domestic tax. If a destination-based consumption tax is used, this re-
form achieves a strict Pareto improvement under sufficiently decreas-
ing marginal costs. If, in contrast, an origin-based production tax is
employed, a strict Pareto improvement holds whether marginal cost is
decreasing or not. Thus, we can conclude that tariff-tax reforms that
improve the world welfare and are irrelevant of tax bases are possible
if the targeted industry exhibits sufficiently decreasing marginal costs.
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization in the form of trade tax/subsidy reductions has remark-
ably increased the world trade flow.1 As international economics suggests,
freer trade benefits an individual country and the world. Despite such ad-
vocacy of free trade, there is persistent hesitation to liberalize trade in both
developing and developed countries. On the one hand, developing countries
fear the expected loss in trade tax revenue that has a large share in overall
government revenue as long as they are a big importing or exporting coun-
try.2 In order to compensate for such a decline in trade tax revenue, the
IMF and the World Bank have suggested combining trade tax reductions
with appropriate adjustments of domestic taxes. On the other hand, tariff-
tax reforms may make sense for developed countries since they may play a
role of mitigating the negative income distribution effect on the comparative
disadvantage sector led by trade liberalization.
Then, one may naturally ask how domestic taxes are adjusted to trade
liberalization for ensuring welfare gains. This paper theoretically answers
this question, but we differentiate it from the previous works in the following
respects. First, we extend a duopoly model of Keen and Ligthart (2005).
They show that a country loses from point-by-point tariff reductions com-
bined with (destination-based) consumption tax increases, which are welfare-
improving under perfect competition (Hatzipanayotou et. al, 1994, and Keen
and Ligthart, 2002). Furthermore, they prove that the same is true of the
tariff-tax reform that leaves the consumer price unchanged. While these re-
sults provide new insights on tariff-tax reforms, Keen and Ligthart (2005, p.
389) state that their negative results are ‘not to say, of course, that there are
no circumstances in which such a coordinated tax-tariff reform will increase
1Baier and Bergstrand (2001), for example, find evidence that tariff reductions have
much larger impacts on world trade growth than trade cost reductions and income equal-
ization.
2IMF (2005, p. 3) offers evidence suggesting that ‘the revenue from trade taxes · · ·
continues to be a major source of government finance in many low- and middle income
countries.’
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welfare even in the presence of imperfect competition. We leave to future
work, however, the characterization of preference and market structures that
are conductive to such an outcome.’
We address the above agenda Keen and Ligthart (2005) leave, and seek
welfare-improving programs of tariff reductions and domestic tax adjust-
ments. To this end, we introduce three new ingredients into the Keen-
Ligthart (2005) model. First, we allow for non-constant marginal costs in
order to identify that the detrimental effects in Keen and Ligthart (2005)
hinge on the assumption of constant marginal cost.3 Second, we consider not
only destination-based consumption taxes but also origin-based production
taxes. This extension is theoretically and practically interesting since Keen
and Ligthart (2005) confine analysis to the destination tax.
Finally and most importantly, we consider a tariff-tax reform that fixes
the world price. The reason for paying special attention to this reform is
that the terms of trade effect is arguably the most crucial elements in the
arguments over trade liberalization.4 While Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002,
2011, 2012a, b) are concerned with multilateral trade policy reforms rather
than unilateral domestic policy reforms, the terms of trade effect is still
significant in evaluating the unilateral tariff-tax reforms.
Besides the theoretical and empirical relevance of the terms of trade effect
stressed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002, 2011, 2012a, b), the world-
price-fixing tariff-tax reform has the following advantages. First, under our
assumption of linear demand, the proposed reform is shown to fix foreign
welfare, and hence induces no foreign retaliation. Second, our reform can
leave the foreign country no-worse-off just by targeting the world price that
is observable. This property is important in view of the reality that foreign
welfare is unobservable.5 Third, our reform strategy is useful in considering
3Since a seminal paper of Krugman (1984), there are many works studying the role of
non-constant marginal cost in international trade, e.g., Zhang and Zhang (1998), Ishikawa
(2004), Ishikawa and Kuroda (2007), and Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008a, b).
4See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002, 2012a, b) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011) for
the theoretical and empirical importance of the terms of trade effect, respectively.
5While the idea of fixing welfare of the rest of the world is familiar in the literature on
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whether it yields a strict Pareto improvement, i.e., it raises the home welfare
without hurting the foreign country. That is, we can conclude that this
reform leads to a world welfare improvement just by checking the effect on
the domestic welfare.
Our conclusion is summarized as follows. If a destination-based consump-
tion tax is employed, a tariff reduction accompanied by a consumption tax
adjustment that fixes the world price raises domestic welfare when the de-
gree of decreasing costs is sufficiently large. If, in contrast, an origin-based
production tax is adopted, the world-price-fixing tariff-tax reform definitely
improves welfare. These findings may serve an answer to the question raised
by Keen and Ligthart (2005) above.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 consider the case of
a destination consumption tax and an origin-based production tax, respec-
tively. Section 4 concludes.
2 Destination-based consumption tax
2.1 Model
We incorporate non-constant marginal costs into the Keen and Ligthart
(2005) model. Suppose a market of a country, say Home, in which a Home
firm (firm X) and a Foreign firm (firm Y) compete in quantities with a
Cournot conjecture. Home’s inverse demand is assumed linear, and denoted
by p(x+ y) with p′(·) < 0 and p′′(·) = 0, where x and y are the output of the
Home and Foreign firms, respectively.6 The production cost of each firm is
given by c(x) and c∗(y) with c′(·) > 0 and c′∗(·) > 0. The Foreign government
observes laissez-faire.
The Home government imposes a destination-based consumption tax τ ≥
customs unions, e.g., Kemp and Wan (1976), implementing it is practically difficult since
welfare is unobservable. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997, p. 487) admittedly state that
‘the information requirement (of the donor-welfare-fixing reform) is quite demanding.’
6The results in this paper admittedly depend on the linear demand assumption, and
one can obtain no clear result under non-linear demand.
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0 and an import tariff t ≥ 0. Then, the profit of each firm is defined by
Home firm : p(x+ y)x− c(x)− τx (1)
Foreign firm : p(x+ y)y − c∗(y)− τy − ty. (2)
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are7
xp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′(x)− τ = 0 (3)
yp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′∗(y)− τ − t = 0. (4)
Totally differentiating (3) and (4), we have8[
2p′ − c′′ p′
p′ 2p′ − c′′∗
] [
dx
dy
]
=
[
1
1
]
dτ +
[
0
1
]
dt,
which leads to the following comparative statics outcomes:
∂x
∂τ
=
p′ − c′′∗
∆
,
∂y
∂τ
=
p′ − c′′
∆
(5)
∂x
∂t
= −p
′
∆
,
∂y
∂t
=
2p′ − c′′
∆
(6)
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
=
2p′ − c′′ − c′′∗
∆
,
∂(x+ y)
∂t
=
p′ − c′′
∆
, (7)
where ∆ is a determinant of the coefficient matrix of the above differentiated
system:
∆ ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ 2p′ − c′′ p′p′ 2p′ − c′′∗
∣∣∣∣∣ = 3(p′)2 − 2p′c′′ − 2p′c′′∗ + c′′c′′∗.
In order to prepare for considering the welfare effect of a tariff-tax reform,
we define the Home welfare as W ≡ CS + Π + T , where
CS ≡
∫ x+y
0
p(X)dX − (x+ y)p(x+ y) (8)
Π ≡ p(x+ y)x− c(x)− τx (9)
T ≡ τ(x+ y) + ty. (10)
In these equations, CS,Π and T respectively represent consumer surplus, the
Home firm’s profit, and government revenue, and x and y depend on the two
taxes through Eqs. (3) and (4).
7The second-order conditions are 2p′(x+ y)− c′′(x) < 0 and 2p′(x+ y)− c′′∗(y) < 0.
8In what follows, the argument of p(·), c(·) and c∗(·) is suppressed.
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2.2 Reform and welfare
We now investigate the welfare effect of a simultaneous change in tariffs and
consumption taxes in a way to fix the world price. The reason for focusing
on this specific tariff-tax reform is that with linear demand it serves to leave
the Foreign welfare unchanged, and hence allows us to know whether the
reform achieves a strict Pareto improvement by looking at the welfare effect
on Home only. Furthermore, considering the fact that multilateral reforms
are generally more costly and difficult to agree, it is useful to explore the
unilateral reform defined above.
We begin by identifying how the two tax rates must change when they
freeze the world price. Since the world price pW is equal to pW = p(x+ y)−
τ − t, a change in τ and t affects the world price as follows.
dpW =
[
p′
∂(x+ y)
∂τ
− 1
]
dτ +
[
p′
∂(x+ y)
∂t
− 1
]
dt.
Hence, the requirement of the fixed world price is dpW = 0, and the two
taxes must change according to
dτ = −p
′ ∂(x+y)
∂t
− 1
p′ ∂(x+y)
∂τ
− 1dt = −
2p′ − c′′
p′ − c′′ dt, (11)
where use is made of (7). Substituting (11) into the right-hand side of the
equation of comparative statics above, it becomes
−2p
′ − c′′
p′ − c′′
[
1
1
]
dt+
[
0
1
]
dt =
 −2p′−c′′p′−c′′
− p′
p′−c′′
 dt.
Therefore, all we have to do henceforth is to make a comparative statics
analysis using the above right-hand side. Straightforward manipulations lead
to
∂x
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= − 1
p′ − c′′ ,
∂y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= 0,
∂(x+ y)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= − 1
p′ − c′′ . (12)
By using (11) and (12), we now address a few properties of the world-
price-fixing reform. First of all, this reform fixes not only the world price but
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also the Foreign firm’s output and Foreign’s welfare since the Foreign firm’s
profit Π∗ (which is also the Foreign welfare) is rewritten as
Π∗ = (p− t− τ)y − c∗(y) = pWy − c∗(y),
and both pW and y are fixed by this reform.9
(Figure 1 around here)
For the time being, let us assume that p′ − c′′ which is satisfied if the
Home firm’s marginal cost is non-decreasing. Then, the effect of the present
reform is illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, the bold loci represent a
pre-reform reaction curve of each firm, and E is the initial Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.10 When the Home government reduces an import tariff, only
the Foreign firm’s reaction curves shifts outward to the dashed locus, which
decreases x and increases y. Eq. (11) allows us to know that the consumption
tax must be raised so that the initial y is restored as (11) and (12) suggest.
When the Home government raises the consumption tax, both firms’ reaction
curve shrinks to a dotted locus, and the post-reform equilibrium becomes E ′
at which x decreases.
(Figure 2 around here)
The foregoing argument is, on the other hand, modified if the degree of
decreasing costs is high enough to have p′ − c′′ > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the
effect of the reform in this case. While the effect of the tariff reduction
is the same as the previous case, the Home government must lower the
consumption tax. This is because the reduced tariff induces a decrease in x,
and hence the Home firm’s marginal cost becomes higher. This decreases x
further, and domestic production eventually becomes too small. Therefore,
9This convenient property crucially depends on the assumptions that (1) demand is
linear and (2) Foreign observes laisses-faire.
10While the figure presumes that the Home firm’s reaction curve is steeper than the For-
eign firm’s reaction curve, our argument holds for the opposite case, namely, the stability
of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is irrelevant.
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the world price will decline as a result of the tariff reduction of Home. In order
to offset such a price-reducing effect, the Home government must expand
domestic consumption by lowering the consumption tax. Then, both firms’
reaction curve shifts out, and the terminal equilibrium becomes E ′ at which
x increases.
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, the effect on the Home firm’s output is
exactly the opposite depending on the sign of p′ − c′′ whereas the Foreign
firm’s output is commonly fixed. This difference in the effect on the Home
firm’s production will play a key role in determining the welfare effect of the
reform.
Having (12) in mind, we examine the effect of the world-price-fixing tariff-
tax reform on Home’s welfare. Differentiating (8), (9) and (10) with respect
to t, we obtain
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −(x+ y)p′ ∂(x+ y)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
(x+ y)p′
p′ − c′′
∂piX
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −x ∂τ
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
x(2p′ − c′′)
p′ − c′′
∂T
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= (x+ y)
∂τ
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ τ
∂(x+ y)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ y
= y − (x+ y)(2p
′ − c′′)
p′ − c′′ −
τ
p′ − c′′ .
By summing these effects up, we have the overall welfare effect:
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
xp′ − τ
p′ − c′′ = −
p− c′
p′ − c′′ , (13)
where the last equality follows from the first-order condition (3). Eq. (13)
establishes:
Proposition 1. A coordinated tariff reduction and an increase (resp. de-
crease) in the destination-based consumption tax in a way to fix the world
price reduce (resp. raise) the Home welfare, and achieve a strict Pareto de-
terioration (resp. improvement) if p′ − c′′ < 0 (resp. p′ − c′′ > 0).
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Proof. Since we have assumed dt < 0, the direction in the Home welfare
associated with the present reform becomes
sign{dW} = sign{p′ − c′′},
which immediately leads to the above result.
(Table 1 around here)
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is well-understood by using the first
and second lows of Table 1. As has already been addressed, the proposed
reform to fix the world price results in fixing the output and welfare of For-
eign. This requirement yields two scenarios depending on the sign of p′− c′′.
Let us see the first low of the table that assumes that p′− c′′ < 0. Then, our
reform decreases the Home firm’s output, which gives rise to a higher domes-
tic price and a smaller consumer surplus. Moreover, the profit of the Home
firm declines due to profit-shifting from Home to Foreign. While the effect
on government revenue is indeterminate, the negative effects on consumer
surplus and the firm profit play a dominant role, thereby reducing welfare of
Home. Invoking that the Foreign welfare is unchanged with this reform, this
means that the proposed reform is strictly Pareto deteriorating.
If, on the other hand, p′ − c′′ is positive, all the above arguments are
reversed as the second low of Table 1 shows, and hence this reform promises
a strict Pareto improvement, namely, it improves the world welfare without
any international lump-sum transfer. In this case, both the Home consumer
and firm gain from the reform, and so welfare improves. In this sense, if
increasing returns are sufficiently strong, this reform could be recommended
from the criterion of a strict Pareto improvement.
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3 Origin-based production tax
3.1 Model
While the last section assumes that a destination-based consumption tax is
available as a domestic tax policy, this section replaces this assumption with
the assumption of an origin-based production tax. This analysis makes much
sense since it enables us to find which between destination- or origin-based
taxes should be adopted in tariff-tax reforms of the kind we consider. We
will demonstrate that employing the production tax unambiguously achieves
a strict Pareto improvement regardless of the sign of c′′. Since the procedure
of proving this result is the same as that of Proposition 1, it suffices to outline
the argument.
Letting s ≥ 0 be an origin-based production tax imposed on domestic
production, the profit of each firm is defined by
Home firm : p(x+ y)x− c(x)− sx
Foreign firm : p(x+ y)y − c∗(y)− ty.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
xp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′(x)− s = 0 (14)
yp′(x+ y) + p(x+ y)− c′∗(y)− t = 0. (15)
Given the assumption of linear demand, total differentiation of (14) and (15)
yields [
2p′ − c′′ p′
p′ 2p′ − c′′∗
] [
dx
dy
]
=
[
1
0
]
ds+
[
0
1
]
dt,
which gives the comparative statics outcome:
∂x
∂s
=
2p′ − c′′∗
∆
,
∂y
∂s
= −p
′
∆
(16)
∂x
∂t
= −p
′
∆
,
∂y
∂t
=
2p′ − c′′
∆
(17)
∂(x+ y)
∂s
=
p′ − c′′∗
∆
,
∂(x+ y)
∂t
=
p′ − c′′
∆
. (18)
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As in the previous section, Home’s welfare consists of consumer surplus,
the Home firm’s profit, and tax revenue:
CS ≡
∫ x+y
0
p(X)dX − (x+ y)p(x+ y) (19)
pi ≡ p(x+ y)x− c(x)− sx (20)
T ≡ sx+ ty. (21)
3.2 Reform and welfare
Based on the preliminaries thus far, we compute the welfare effect of a tariff-
tax reform that fixes the world price defined by pW = p(x+ y)− t. Since the
two taxes affect the world price as
dpW = p′
∂(x+ y)
∂s
ds+
[
p′
∂(x+ y)
∂t
− 1
]
dt,
the requirement of the fixed world price dpW = 0 implies
ds = −p
′ ∂(x+y)
∂t
− 1
p′ ∂(x+y)
∂s
dt =
2p′ − c′′
p′
dt. (22)
Substituting (22) into the right-hand side of the totally-differentiated system
of equations, it becomes
2p′ − c′′
p′
[
1
0
]
dt+
[
0
1
]
dt =
[
2p′−c′′
p′
1
]
dt.
Using this right-hand side, the effects of this reform on the equilibrium out-
puts are
∂x
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
1
p′
,
∂y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= 0,
∂(x+ y)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
1
p′
. (23)
Eqs. (22) and (23) convince us a few properties of the proposed reform
that are parallel to the consumption tax case. First, by repeating the same
argument as that of the last section, this reform fixes the output and profit of
the Foreign firm as well as the world price. Thus, in order to check whether
this reform is strictly Pareto-improving, we have only to examine the welfare
effect on Home.
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(Figure 3 around here)
Another property is explained with Figure 3 that depicts a reaction curve
diagram of the present case. The pre-reform equilibrium is E, which is an
intersection of the bold reaction curves. When an import tariff is reduced,
only the Foreign firm’s reaction curve shifts outward to the dashed locus,
and thereby decreases x and increases y. Therefore, the only way to restore
the initial y is to reduce the production tax so that the Home firm’s reaction
curve shifts to the dotted locus. Then, we can easily notice that the new
equilibrium is given by E ′, and that x increases after the reform.
Taking into account these observations, the effect of the policy reform
above on the three welfare components is derived as
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −(x+ y)p′ ∂(x+ y)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −(x+ y)
∂piX
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −x ∂s
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −x(2p
′ − c′′)
p′
∂T
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= x
∂s
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ s
∂x
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ y + t
∂y
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= y +
x(2p′ − c′′) + s
p′
.
Aggregating these effects yields
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −x+ s
p′
=
p− c′
p′
< 0, (24)
where the last equality comes from the first-order condition (14). Thus, we
have arrived at:
Proposition 2. A coordinated tariff reduction and a decrease in the origin-
based production tax in a way to fix the world price raise the Home welfare,
and achieve a strict Pareto improvement.
Making use of the third low of Table 1, let us intuitively interpret Proposi-
tion 2. As mentioned above, the Home government has to reduce the produc-
tion tax to offset the prospective rise in the world price induced by the tariff
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cut. This leads to an increase in the Home firm’s output without changing
the Foreign output. Consequently, this reform expands the total supply, and
benefits consumer surplus of Home by lowering the domestic price. Another
natural consequence is that the Home firm also gains from this reform. As
is also the case in the previous section, the effect on government revenue is
unclear, but Home’s aggregate welfare improves since the positive effects on
consumer surplus and the firm profit play a major role.
In the case of consumption taxes, there is a possibility that welfare im-
proves if the sign of c′′ is negative enough to have p′ − c′′ > 0. However,
the above result needs no such restriction. Regardless of the sign of c′′, the
welfare-improving property of the reform holds. In short, if the degree of
decreasing marginal cost is sufficiently large, the choice of tax principles is
irrelevant in the sense that adjusting any of the destination- and origin-based
taxes to tariff reductions yields a strict Pareto improvement.11
Remark. The analysis thus far has focused on the welfare effects of the
world-price-fixing tariff-tax reforms. However, it is of some importance to
look into the effect on government revenue since it is the central concern as
mentioned in Introduction.
In the destination-tax case, the revenue effect is given by
∂T
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= y − (x+ y)(2p
′ − c′′)
p′ − c′′ −
τ
p′ − c′′
=
xc′′ − (3x+ y)p′ − p+ c′
p− c′′ ,
whereas the counterpart in the origin-tax case is
∂T
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= y +
x(2p′ − c′′) + s
p′
=
−xc′′ + (3x+ y)p′ + p− c′
p′
.
11Keen and Lahiri (1998), Haufler and Pfluger (2004), and Hashimzade et al. (2005)
establish a superiority of the origin-based taxation while Keen and Lahiri (1993) and Keen
et al. (2002) show the superiority of the destination-based tax.
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These equations both tell that the revenue effect of the proposed reforms can
be positive, i.e., ∂T/∂t|dpW=0 < 0 if the marginal cost is decreasing c′′ < 0,
and its negativity is sufficiently high.12
4 Concluding remarks
Using a simple duopoly model, we have explored whether world-price-fixing
tariff reductions with appropriate adjustments of either destination-based
consumption taxes or origin-based production taxes achieve a strict Pareto
improvement. We have shown that under the destination principle the sug-
gested reform reduces welfare if marginal cost is non-decreasing while it can
be strictly Pareto-improving under sufficiently decreasing marginal cost. On
the other hand, this reform necessarily results in a strict Pareto improvement
if the origin-based production tax is employed. These findings may be use-
ful for a practical policy-making over trade liberalization in developed and
developing countries.
One may wonder whether the above results are specific to the model cho-
sen. This guess is partially correct since we do not know whether a similar
finding still holds in another market structure, e.g., Bertand duopoly and
monopolistic competition. However, we have already proved the validity
of our conclusion in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model and
a duopoly model with market integration of the type of Keen and Lahiri
(1993, 1998) and Keen et al. (2002). Furthermore, we have ruled out the
presence of public goods. When we introduce an externality arising from
public goods, our results may be modified by invoking the earlier contribu-
tions of Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007) and Karakosta et al. (2012).
To summarize, our results have a certain validity, but may not survive some
market structures with and without public goods. It is our research agenda
to study whether our results survive another type of imperfect competition
12One may wonder if the second-order condition for profit maximization is violated if
c′′ is too negative. But, this is not the case if we use the following demand and cost
specifications: p(x+ y) = a−x− y, a > 0 and c(x) = 1− e−bx, b > 0. Under this example,
the positive revenue effect is guaranteed for sufficiently large b.
14
and the presence of public goods.
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Figure 1: The Effect of the Reform: Destination-Based Consumption Tax
and p′ − c′′ < 0
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Figure 2: The Effect of the Reform: Destination-Based Consumption Tax
and p′ − c′′ > 0
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Figure 3: The Effect of the Reform: Origin-Based Production Tax
x y p CS pi T W W ∗ W +W ∗
consumption tax (i) − 0 + − − ? − 0 −
consumption tax (ii) + 0 − + + ? + 0 +
production tax + 0 − + + ? + 0 +
Table 1: Effects of the Reform (note: (i) is the case of p′ − c′′ < 0 and (ii) is
the case of p′ − c′′ > 0)
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